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RESPONSE
RECONSTRUCTING GALSTON'S CONCEPTION OF STATE
NEUTRALITY
GEORGE W. HARRIs*
I.
Any conception of political morality applying to modern west-
ern societies will reflect a conception of state neutrality, whether
that morality be liberal, utilitarian, or perfectionist. Articulating
a conception of state neutrality becomes especially crucial to lib-
eralism, however, because, according to liberalism, the problem
of a well-ordered society for western states is the problem of
what principles of social cooperation are rational for a society in
which central kinds of conflicts involve a plurality of competing
conceptions of how it is best to live.1 Different versions of liberal-
ism, then, can be distinguished from each other in terms of the
different conceptions of state neutrality they reflect. My purpose
here is to contrast the conception of state neutrality reflected in
William Galston's recent work2 with one of its major competi-
tors. The result will be a clarification of Galston's reconstruction
of state neutrality.
Before turning to that task, I first want to clarify the notion of
neutrality I wish to discuss. Much has been written about the
structure of liberal arguments for particular conceptions of polit-
* Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, College of William and Mary.
Many thanks to Cynthia Ward for organizing the symposium, "Reconstructing Liber-
alism," to Bill Galston for his insightful essay, to Larry Becker, Dwight Furrow, and
Alan Fuchs for discussion, and to the students in my Ethics and Law Seminar,
Spring 1998.
1. See CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATrERNS OF MORAL CoMPLEXT 69-70 (1987).
2. See William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Plural-
ism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 869 (1999).
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ical morality as to whether theory should begin with the "right"
or the "good."3 Some have argued that to begin with the right is
to construct a political morality in a way that is neutral regard-
ing any conception of what makes a life good. a Others, including
Galston, have argued that political theory must begin with a
conception of the good and derive a conception of liberalism from
it. 5 I believe that Galston is correct on this issue, but this is not
the issue I wish to discuss. The issue of the neutrality of philo-
sophical theory is different from the issue of how neutral the
state should be regarding the different conceptions of the good
life its citizens pursue. Whatever structure political theory
takes, the political morality it produces will reflect a normative
conception of state neutrality, a conception of how the state is
morally restricted from taking sides on competing conceptions of
the good life.6 For my purposes, it does not matter how the con-
ception of state neutrality is derived from its theoretical base,
from the right or from the good; all that matters is what it is. I
simply am interested in getting a grip on how competing concep-
tions of liberalism differ in terms of their conceptions of state
neutrality. Were we able to isolate all the major liberal competi-
tors in these terms, we would improve our understanding of the
philosophical options before us, as we would by isolating the
nonliberal competitors for our assent. No view that fails to rec-
ognize the facts of pluralism is a real competitor, which means
that any plausible political morality,must require some norma-
tive notion of state neutrality. Until a conception is refined to
bring its version of state neutrality into focus, the option it rep-
resents will not be entirely clear to us.
3. See John Rawls, John Rawls: The Right and the Good Contrasted, in LIBER-
ALISM AND ITS CRIcs 37-59 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
4. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 21-43 (1989);
LARMORE, supra note 1, at 69-70; Rawls, supra note 3, at 37-59.
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DI-
VERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CTZEN-
SHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); JOSEPH RAz,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
6. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 5, at 110-11.
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II.
Consider two liberal competitors. The first has a Kantian lin-
eage, and the second a lineage to Isaiah Berlin. The idea is to
understand how beginning with fundamentally different concep-
tions of the foundations of morality can yield fundamentally dif-
ferent conceptions of liberalism and state neutrality.
The Kantian lineage I have in mind begins with the thought
that what is important about political principles is how they
apply to persons in terms of what is most important about per-
sons.7 Persons have a certain kind of value, and it is this partic-
ular kind of value that is the foundation for morality, even
political morality. We first need to understand the kind of value
persons are supposed to have on this view and, second, what it
is about persons that gives them this kind of value.
The kind of value in question is the special value that atta-
ches to dignity. What is it to value something as possessing dig-
nity? Barbara Herman, a contemporary Kantian, put it this way
in the context of explaining the value of our rational nature:
Rational nature as value is both absolute and nonscalar. It is
absolute in the sense that there is no other kind of value or
goodness for whose sake rational nature can count as a
means. It is nonscalar in the sense that (1) it is not the high-
est value on a single inclusive scale of value, and (2) it is not
additive: more instantiations of rational nature do not en-
hance the value content of the world, and more instances of
respect for rational nature do not move anything or anyone
along a scale of dignity. There is no such scale!
Thomas Hill expressed a similar thought when he wrote,
"[D]ignity cannot morally or reasonably be exchanged for any-
thing of greater value, whether the value is dignity or price. One
cannot then, trade off the dignity of humanity in one person
in order to honor a greater dignity in two, ten, or a thousand
persons."9
7. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785) (discussing persons as objective ends);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1971) (discussing the principle of utility
as treating persons as both ends and means).
8. BARBARA HERiN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 238 (1993).
9. THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY
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To think of something as having the kind of value worthy of
dignity is to think of it as a qualitatively different kind of value
from all other values. The fundamental Kantian thought is that
whatever possesses dignity is recognized as having a value that
cannot be calculated in terms of its benefits." To recognize dig-
nity in terms of its benefits would imply one of three possibili-
ties, all of which fail to grasp-according to the Kantian ac-
count-the particular kind of value dignity has." The first possi-
bility is that dignity is an instrumental value to the production
of some intrinsic value, perhaps the intrinsic value of happiness.
The value of dignity, however, is not to be found in its instru-
mental properties to produce happiness in us or to produce any-
thing else. To think this is simply to fail to recognize that digni-
ty is an intrinsic value. The second possibility is that although
dignity is an intrinsic value, there is some greater intrinsic val-
ue in terms of which the intrinsic value of dignity can be traded
off. Again, however, to think of dignity in this way is to misun-
derstand the kind of value dignity retains. Dignity is the most
fundamental kind of intrinsic value. That we would not sacrifice
the dignity of one person for the happiness of many is evidence
of this, as is the value we place on human beings as opposed to
lower animals. We might care deeply and intrinsically about the
well-being of both human beings and lower animals, but the rea-
son the concern for human well-being is more fundamental than
the concern for the well-being of lower animals is that we have a
dignity that lower animals do not.'" From these first two points,
then, we can see that dignity is neither a means to happiness
nor a kind of intrinsic value that can be traded off for other in-
trinsic values, especially the intrinsic value of happiness-our
own or that of others. Finally, if dignity could be calculated in
terms of its benefits, this might allow one to trade off some dig-
nity for the benefit of more dignity. The comments of both
Herman and Hill suggest that if we think of dignity as allowing
49 (1992).
10. See KANT, supra note 7, at 102-03.
11. See id
12. See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239-41 (Louis Infield trans., Harp-
er & Row 1963) (1930).
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quantitative tradeoffs within dignity, we have not yet under-
stood the special kind of intrinsic value dignity retains.'3
What is it about persons, according to the Kantian tradition,
that gives them their dignity? This is where the concept of au-
tonomy enters both the moral and the political arena. Dignity is
conferred upon persons by their higher order capacities, capaci-
ties that distinguish persons as autonomous agents who are ra-
tional choosers, from other animals. 4 To recognize the dignity of
persons, then, is to respond with respect for their autonomy. We
can understand autonomy by understanding what the higher
order capacities of persons are said to be, in terms of which re-
spect is the proper evaluative attitude toward beings who have
dignity. First, we, as persons, have the higher order capacity to
set ends for ourselves in a way that reflects our own distinctive
conception of a good life.'" Second, we have the higher order ca-
pacity to take responsibility for our lives and our own happiness
in a way that is inconsistent with merely being passive recipi-
ents of happiness as a benefit bestowed upon us by the agency of
others." Finally, we have the higher order capacity to set our
ends in a way that recognizes the equal worth of others to set
their ends in accordance with their higher order capacities." To
respect others for their dignity, then, when it is for their higher
order capacities, is to-see oneself as restricted in a certain way
from interfering with the exercise of their higher order capaci-
ties. It also is, according to Kant, to see oneself as committed to
promoting the conditions under which it is possible for oneself
and others to exercise these higher order capacities.'"
What has all this to do with state neutrality? The first feature
of our higher order capacities is possible only when there is a
plurality of ways in which we can set our ends as constituting
13. See HERMAN, supra note 8, at 125, 237-38; HILL, supra note 9, at 10.
14. See KANT, supra note 7, at 98, 103 (discussing Kant's formula of autonomy).
15. See id at 98-99.
16. See id. at 98-102.
17. See i
18. See id at 100-02 (describing the formula of the Kingdom of Ends, which is
defined as "a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws ...
[which are] directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends
and means").
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ways of life in which we might invest meaning and purpose;'"
Without plurality in this sense, this particular higher order ca-
pacity would be neither possible nor necessary. Thus, without
plurality of possible sets of ends in which we can invest mean-
ing, there is no dignity because without plurality in this sense,
the value of our lives could not be a matter of choice. If the state
is to be organized in a way that recognizes the dignity of per-
sons, it must be neutral regarding the sets of ends that can pro-
vide meaning and purpose to the lives of its citizens. Moreover,
this neutrality must be quite broad because, on this view, a way
of life has its moral standing by virtue of its being the object of
autonomous choice,20 the product of a being who has this first
higher order capacity. A way of life has no prior moral value. If,
in the name of some independent value, the state violates neu-
trality regarding the kinds of ends that persons with this first
higher order capacity can choose, it interferes with the higher
order capacities of persons and hence does not show respect for
their dignity.
The second higher order capacity places restrictions on pater-
nalism.2 ' To act for the good of an adult against her own choices
is to treat her as though she does not have the higher order ca-
pacity of taking responsibility for the consequences of setting her
own ends. On the other hand, we are justified in treating chil-
dren paternalistically only to the extent to which doing so is nec-
essary to develop the child's higher order capacities. In the first
case, to stand as a buffer between the adult's choices and the
consequences of her choices is to interfere with the exercise of
her higher order capacities. It is to treat her as though she is
incapable of calculating the costs of her choices. Not to act
paternalistically for the sake of the child's autonomy is to fail to
promote the conditions under which the child's higher order ca-
pacities and dignity are possible. Where, then, a conception of
state neutrality is designed to track this dignity-conferring
19. See i&d at 101.
20. See id (noting that the making of laws must be able to spring from the will
of every rational being).
21. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 156-57 (Mary Gregor
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
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capacity, the state must remain neutral regarding the good of its
individual (adult) citizens when they have been irresponsible
concerning their own good. To respect adult persons for their
possession of the second higher order capacity is to be neutral
not between different good lives individuals might choose, but
between whether their lives are good or bad. Otherwise, dignity
is not properly recognized and respected. Our respect for people's
agency must regulate our sympathy for them in this regard or
we will not value their dignity.
Finally, we are justified in interfering with the choices that
are the products of the first two higher order capacities of those
who refuse to exercise the third higher order capacity-the fail-
ure to set ends in a way that is consistent with the exercise of
others' higher order capacities. First, we may ignore their ends
as having no moral relevance to how the state should be or-
dered. The state need not be neutral regarding ways of life that
are not the product of all three higher order capacities, because
they are not the proper objects of autonomous choice. Second,
under certain circumstances, we must punish persons who have,
but do not exercise, the third capacity in order to recognize and
pay proper tribute to their dignity. This is the sense in which
punishment is to be understood as retribution rather than a de-
terrent. Punishment is not a benefit conferred upon victims of
crimes as revenge or upon potential victims of crimes as a deter-
rent, but the benefit of proper respect for the dignity of crimi-
nals." In its retributive function,23 the state is to be neutral re-
garding the good of criminals and their victims; otherwise, digni-
ty becomes scalar and quantifiable. This, of course, is neutrality
with a vengeance. Lastly, in its distributive function,24 the state
is justified in restricting its support for optional ways of life to
those that are compatible with the equal recognition of the
worth of the higher order capacities of all persons. Otherwise,
the state is to be neutral in its distributive role. To do otherwise
is to fail to recognize the equal intrinsic worth of persons in
terms of their higher order capacities. It is to treat dignity as
though it is scalar and quantifiable.
22. See ic. at 104-05.
23. See id at 105-09.
24. See id at 100-02.
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This is the more or less pure story. The state is to be neutral
in its protective function25 regarding all ways of life that are the
objects of autonomous choice when all three higher order capaci-
ties are operative in the choice. In its promotional function,26 the
state can favor ways of life that are the objects of choice in
which all three higher order capacities are operative over those
that are not, but it cannot favor one of these over the other. Pa-
ternalistic legislation will be restricted severely, which reflects a
certain kind of neutrality between good and bad lives; and crimi-
nal legislation in its assignment of punishment will be neutral
regarding the dignity of criminals and their victims. All this is a
conception of neutrality required by a certain view of the worth
of persons and their dignity.
Of course, few contemporary liberals accept the entire story.
Rawls's rejection of merit in favor of entitlement goes deeply
against the grain of tying dignity to the second higher order ca-
pacity.27 Unlike Kant, Rawls seems to reduce moral personality
to luck. Whether we are responsible agents in the second sense
is, according to Rawls, a matter of factors that are arbitrary
from the moral point of view.2' Rawls seems to think, however,
that the third higher order capacity is in place.29 That is, he
seems to think that although our capacity for effort is the result
of factors that are arbitrary from the moral point of view, 0 our
capacity for adjusting our ends to accommodate the ends of oth-
ers is not. 1 This is a tension not only within Rawls's view, but
also a tension he has with the tradition he is trying to revise.
Similar tensions within the attempt to construct a conception of
liberalism out of the Kantian lineage appear in theories of pun-
ishment, as well as in theories regarding paternalism and mi-
nority rights.32 Almost no one accepts the pure story intact.
25. See KANT, supra note 7, at 100-02.
26. See id,
27. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 310-15.
28. See id
29. See id
30. See id at 311-12 (arguing that the idea of rewarding moral desert is im-
practicable).
31. See id
32. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 206-19 (discussing minority rights and
[Vol. 40:909916
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What survives is an attempt to tie liberalism to the concern for
the worth of persons, spelled out in terms of the special value of
dignity. Any such view is going to entail a rather expansive
notion of state neutrality.
mI.
We get a much different conception of liberalism and state
neutrality if we begin with the conception of morality and its
foundations as found in the thought of Isaiah Berlin."3 Berlin
was both a liberal and a moral pluralist. If what I have said
thus far is correct, his liberalism informed by his moral plural-
ism will yield a conception of state neutrality different from the
conception of state neutrality reflected in the Kantian tradition,
which emphasizes human dignity. Galstonian liberalism is to be
understood as a variant of Berlin's liberalism.
According to Berlin, there are plural and conflicting moral
values.34 This thesis involves the following four claims: (i) there
is a plurality of moral values; (ii) ultimate moral values can con-
flict, all things considered; (iii) there is no moral scale indexed to
some highest moral value in terms of which all moral conflicts
can be resolved, which, together with (ii), means that ultimate
moral values are incommensurable; and (iv) the realization of
any ultimate moral value comes at the loss of some other ulti-
mate moral value."5
The most important thing to note about these claims regard-
ing moral value is that they all conflict with the Kantian tradi-
tion. First, the source of moral value on the Kantian tradition is
singular, not plural: moral value is conferred by choice, the exer-
cise of the higher order capacities of agency, and by nothing
else. 6 Second, whatever conflicts with the dignity conferring
the liberal tradition).
33. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY (Henry Hardy
ed., Alfred A. Knoph 1991) (1990) [hereinafter BERLIN, CROOKED TIMBER]; ISAIAH
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969).
34. See Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in BERLIN, CROOKED TIMBER, su-
pra note 33, at 1, 11-12.
35. See id at 11-17.
36. See KANT, supra note 7, at 102-03.
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higher order capacities for choice involves a conflict between the
moral and the nonmoral; it is not a conflict between moral val-
ues."1 Third, human dignity, with its foundation in our higher
order capacities for agency, provides a moral scale in terms of
which we can resolve conflicts with all nonmoral values. 8 On
the fourth point, there is some ambiguity regarding the Kantian
contrast. One possibility is that because human dignity is both
nonscalar and nonquantifiable, the realization of moral value
seems to be all or nothing: if more instances of human dignity
do not add to the value of a world, fewer instances do not lessen
its value. Another possibility is that there is moral loss that can
come in degrees, but the loss is to be understood as the loss of
choice or the capacity for choice and nothing else.
If Berlin is correct, the realization of the capacity for choice in
some things, or an increase in the capacity for a greater range of
choices, can come at the moral cost of something else-for exam-
ple, close personal ties, community, religion, or excellence-all of
which are independent moral values in his view. 9 If Berlin is
correct about moral pluralism, the Kantian account of human
dignity simply is exaggerated and false to the nature of moral
value, even the moral value of human dignity. It cannot possibly
serve as the foundation for either personal or political morality.
What should be clear is that one cannot be both Kantian and a
moral pluralist.
IV
How does all this factor into Galston's version of liberalism?
The answer lies in an understanding of how the conception of
state neutrality is a function of four variables: expressive liber-
ty, moral pluralism, political pluralism, and the need for public
order.4 ° What are the ways in which these variables can produce
a conception of state neutrality different from the conception
that is traced to what we now can call Kantian liberalism?
37. See KANT, supra note 21, at 16-17.
38. See id.
39. See Berlin, supra note 34, at 12 (discussing clashing values within a single
individual, between individuals, and between groups).
40. Cf Galston, supra note 2, at 876-84 (discussing expressive liberty, moral plu-
ralism, and political pluralism).
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The first way in which neutrality can be limited on grounds
inconsistent with the Kantian account of human dignity is a
purely practical one, and it involves the relationship between
expressive liberty and the need for public order. Expressive lib-
erty claims that a citizen has to pursue a way of life that best
expresses his or her most fundamental values, values that give
purpose and meaning to his or her life.4' Implementing the pro-
gram of Kantian liberalism forces too many people to live
against their deepest values, thereby restricting their expressive
liberty and compromising the need for public order. The very
possibility of society requires a basic level of public order; there-
fore, there are practical reasons that serve as a rational basis for
compromising on dignity as understood by the Kantian tradition.
This suggests that whatever our considered conception of human
dignity is, it is one that allows for some tradeoffs involving more
dignity rather than less. Surely it is rational to maintain basic
public order in the name of autonomy itself, where the greater
autonomy is preferable rationally to the lesser autonomy, at
least in the extremes. One might not think that marginal trade-
offs in autonomy are rational, but here we are talking about
more than marginal differences. It is one thing to say that we
should maximize the opportunities for choice, but it is another to
say that we should secure the conditions for the kinds of choice
that make a society possible in actual historical circumstances.
Stated this way, the concession to Kantian state neutrality is
made on merely practical grounds. Galston, however, wants to
claim that his view is morally as well as practically superior to
Kantian liberalism.42 The basis for his claim is found in his en-
dorsement of moral pluralism.43 According to Galston, moral plu-
ralism is reflected in plural and conflicting ways of life that have
moral value.4 Moreover, the autonomous way of life is only one
among a plurality of ways of life that have moral value.45 It fol-
lows from this that some ways of life have moral value that are
41. See id. at 876.
42. See hi- at 885-90.
43. See i at 878-80.
44. See i.
45. See i at 888-90.
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not the objects of autonomous choice. If the state has a prima
facie obligation to be neutral between all morally legitimate
ways of life, there will be a significant difference between
Galstonian liberalism and Kantian liberalism in this regard.
Both forms of liberalism will assert that the state has a prima
facie obligation to remain neutral between all morally legitimate
ways of life, but they will construe morally legitimate ways of
life differently." On the Kantian side, prior to choice, all ways of
life are nonmoral.47 Neutrality, then, will be between nonmoral
ways of life that can be chosen autonomously as a fumction of
the operation of all three higher order capacities. For the moral
pluralist, however, in some cases liberalism will require neutral-
ity between ways of life that can be chosen autonomously and
others that cannot-or at least are not-chosen autonomously,
all of which are moral ways of life." From one perspective, this
means that Galstonian liberalism is more expansive in its ver-
sion of neutrality than Kantian liberalism. Galstonian liberalism
is more expansive in its vision of what counts as a moral way of
life. From another perspective, however, it is considerably less
expansive: to make room for morally legitimate ways of life that
are not the objects of autonomous choice, there must be less
room for individualistic conceptions of autonomous choice. This,
I take it, is among the lessons to be learned from Meyer v. Ne-
braska,49 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,50 and Wisconsin v. Yoder."l
The differences between these two conceptions of moral neu-
trality, the Kantian and the Galstonian, yield differences on two
other concepts: the concept of the value of diversity and the con-
cept of what comprises the problem of a well-ordered society. As
46. See KANT, supra note 7, at 100-02; Galston, supra note 2, at 878-79.
47. See KANT, supra note 7, at 107-08.
48. See Galston, supra note 2, at 877-78.
49. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional a Nebraska statute prohibiting
the teaching of any school subject in a language other than English until a student
reached the ninth grade).
50. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (declaring an Oregon statute requiring children between
ages 8 and 16 to attend public schools unconstitutional as a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment rights).
51. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a state law compelling Amish children who
have completed the eighth grade to attend high school was inconsistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
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to the value of diversity, the Kantian scheme values a diversity
of nonmoral ways of life as candidates for autonomous choice;52
the Galstonian scheme, on the other hand, values a diversity of
moral ways of life, some of which are incommensurable and not
all of which are candidates for autonomous choice.53 As to how
each interprets the problem of what a well-ordered society is,
the Kantian scheme interprets the problem to be about how ra-
tionally to resolve conflicts between advocates of different non-
moral ways of life;"' the Galstonian scheme, on the other hand,
interprets the problem to be about how to reconcile conflicts con-
cerning moral ways of life.5 On the latter view, to interpret con-
flicts between religious persons and secular Kantians to be
about autonomy is to insist on a view of those conflicts that is
not true to what is actually going on from the perspective of
those involved. Here again, the cases mentioned in the previous
paragraph are supposed to be telling in favor of Galston's ver-
sion of liberalism.
56
Like the Kantian alternative, the state need not be neutral
regarding immoral ways of life, but this lack of neutrality is not
to be understood in the same way as in the Kantian scheme.
Morally legitimate ways of life are not determined simply by the
criteria of autonomous choice. Rather, ways of life that do not
pass a certain baseline are to be understood as immoral ways of
life.57 The baseline, as I understand it, involves two criteria re-
quiring the valuing of humanity. The first criterion is that ways
of life that do not value the perpetuation of human life are im-
moral ways of life. Ways of life that value human sacrifice are
therefore immoral, and the state is not to be neutral regarding
them. The second criterion is that ways of life that are not com-
mitted to the development of basic human capacities also are
immoral. Here, Galston is influenced by the work of Nussbaum
and Sen.5" The idea is that there is a notion of basic human ca-
52. See KANT, supra note 7, at 104-07.
53. See Galstan, supra note 2, at 889.
54. See KANT, supra note 7, at 100-01 (discussing the resolution of these conflicts).
55. See Galston, supra note 2,, at 875.
56. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
57. See Galston, supra note 2 at 883.
58. See Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Introduction to Tim QuALITY OF LiFE 1
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pacities and their development that falls short of the develop-
ment of the higher order capacities involved in Kantian autono-
my.59 If some religious ways of life cannot be chosen autono-
mously, and yet have moral value and require a significant de-
velopment of human capacities, there must be some level of the
development of human capacities that marks a moral baseline
short of the Kantian standard. Non-neutrality for Galstonian
liberalism regarding the immoral will be much different than for
Kantian liberalism.
The issue of moral pluralism and its bearing on state neutrali-
ty is even more complicated. The reason is that Galstonian liber-
alism is not committed to the view that the state is to be neutral
between all morally legitimate ways of life.6" The reason for this
is that there can be conflicts between morally legitimate ways of
life such that it is not possible to combine those ways of life
within a well-ordered society-that is, in a way that preserves
public order. When this is the case, the state is justified in dis-
criminating against some morally legitimate ways of life in the
service of public order. Such cases mark a kind of tragic choice a
society might have to make.
To this point, then, we have four elements of state neutrality
on the Galstonian model that we can understand in terms of
when the state is justified in being non-neutral. First, the state
can be non-neutral regarding any way of life that poses a suffi-
cient threat to public order in terms of the purely practical con-
sideration of expressive liberty.6' Second, the state is justified in
being non-neutral regarding some ways of life that can be cho-
sen autonomously on the grounds that they do not make suffi-
cient place for the expressive liberty of those who have morally
legitimate ways of life that are not the objects of autonomous
choice.62 Third, the state is justified in being non-neutral re-
garding morally legitimate ways of life and those that are im-
moral, when the moral baseline for the latter is not defined in
(Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
59. See id. at 3 (introducing the functionings and capabilities of individuals).
60. See Galston, supra note 2, at 883-84.
61. See id at 876-78.
62. See id at 875-76.
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terms of the capacities for Kantian autonomy but in terms of
something short of that.6 3 Fourth, the state is justified in being
non-neutral regarding some conflicts between morally legitimate
ways of life when it is not possible to combine those ways of life
within a well-ordered society.6' Barring these kinds of justified
non-neutrality, the state is to be neutral regarding all morally
legitimate ways of life.
This is true, I believe, even when we factor in Galston's final
variable, political pluralism. Political pluralism is a thesis re-
garding the sources of social authority, and it is not easy to ar-
ticulate.6 5 What is needed is a clear contrast with its denial,
which Galston identifies with the plenipotentiary state.66 The
plenipotentiary state is the state in which state authority has a
certain supremacy over all other sources of social authority. 7
One form the plenipotentiary state might take is in a society in
which there are no other sources of social authority other than
state authority. Some forms of communism approach this, which
is evident in their attempts to eradicate both family structures
and religion. 8 Other forms of the plenipotentiary state are less
radical. They might well recognize other sources of social author-
ity, but arrange these sources hierarchically somewhat in the
way that the military orders ranks. There might, for example, be
a place for both religious authority and parental authority, but
these are subordinate to the political authority of the state such
that these authorities can be molded to serve the ends of the
state, construed liberally, radically, or conservatively.
However the sources of social authority are related to each
other, it is never the case in the plenipotentiary state that there
are sources of social authority that the state is bound to recog-
nize as being in some respects more authoritative than the
State. Political pluralism denies this. It asserts that just as
there are domains over which state authority is supreme, there
63. See id at 883-84.
64. See i& at 884 (explaining state power as the key source of order).
65. See i& at 880-82.
66. See id at 881.
67. See id
68. See WILuIAM LAIRD KLEINE-AHLBRANDT, EUROPE SINCE 1945: FROM CONFLICT
TO COMMUNiTy 131-34, 144-45, 212-13 (1993).
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are social domains over which other sources of social authority
are to be recognized as supreme by the state.69 More concretely,
political pluralism is the view that an acceptable conception of
political authority-state authority-is one that recognizes that
state authority both limits and is limited by other sources of so-
cial authority, especially religious and parental authorities.7 ° On
this view, the state must remain neutral regarding these other
authorities except in cases where (i) the purely practical need for
public order requires intervention, (ii) these other sources of po-
litical authority have been employed in the service of immoral
ways of life that do not properly value the perpetuation of life
and the development of basic human capacities, or (iii) the rec-
ognition of these sources in some cases involves morally legiti-
mate ways of life that cannot be combined in one society in a
way that preserves basic public order.71 The sources of social
authority that serve as limits on state authority have their foun-
dation in various forms of life that are plural and conflicting but
are nonetheless morally legitimate.72 Morally legitimate ways of
life have different authoritative structures, therefore valuing the
diversity of morally legitimate ways of life requires the recogni-
tion of independent sources of social authority. Political plural-
ism, then, is a function of moral pluralism. Again, these are
among the lessons of the court cases previously cited.73
It is difficult to see how to avoid the plenipotentiary state and
its conception of political authority when political morality is
dictated by the single moral value of human dignity, where hu-
man dignity has its sole foundation in respect for the higher or-
der capacities already explained in the Kantian model. To allow
for sources of social authority that are restrictions on state au-
thority as construed in the Kantian fashion is to allow tradeoffs
between dignity and other values.
We have, then, a fairly clear contrast between the conceptions
of state neutrality involved in Kantian liberalism and Galston-
ian liberalism, with its lineage to Isaiah Berlin. The latter clearly
69. See Galston, supra note 2, at 881.
70. See id at 881-82.
71. See i& at 892-95.
72. See id at 901-02.
73. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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argues for what is in popular political terms a form of modera-
tion in politics. It calls for a reconception of the problem of a
well-ordered society by asking us to see the conflicts we face as
conflicts between different moral outlooks, some of which are
incommensurable.74 It rejects the idea that there is one moral
view that should dominate the structure of the state.75 It is
ameliorist rather than utopian or conservative, but it clearly
rejects a notion of human dignity that has been dominant in our
tradition. The contrasts between the two versions of liberalism
seem to better reflect the kinds of intellectual values that are in
tension in western societies than do the contrasts in the liberal-
ism/communitarianism debate. For this reason, I think it impor-
tant that Kantian liberals spend more of their energies coming
to grips with Galston and Berlin's liberalism than with continu-
ing debates with communitarians. Moreover, if moral pluralism
is true, as I think it is, there is the important task of recon-
structing our notion of human dignity.
76
74. See Galston, supra note 2, at 882-84.
75. See id at 878-80.
76. See GEORGE W. HARRIS, DIGNITY AND VULNERABILIY: STRENGTH AND QUALrrY
OF CHARACTER (1997).
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